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STATUTES DETERMINATIVE OF ISSUES
Utah Code Ann., § 78-27-56 (1988)
Attorney's fees - Award where action or defense in bad faith Exceptions.
(1)
attorney's
the action
brought or

In civil actions, the court shall award reasonable
fees to a prevailing party if the court determines that
or defense to the action was without merit and not
asserted in good faith, except under Subsection (2).

(2) The court, in its discretion, may award no fees or
limited fees against a party under Subsection (1), but only if the
court:
(a)
finds the party has filed an affidavit
impecuniosity in the action before the court; or

of

(b) the court enters in the record the reason for not
awarding fees under the provisions of Subsection (1).

iii
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CROSS-APP*:TJ.ANT.q' REPLY ARGUMENT
POINT VI
THE COURT IMPROPERLY CONCLUDED THAT THE ATTORNEYS FEE CLAIM OF
CONDER & WANGSGARD SHOULD BE DISCOUNTED BY 10%.
1.
Cross Appellants are not required to marshal1 evidence
when challenging conclusions of law.
Cross Appellee

Dylon

has

asserted

that the

Co-personal

Representatives have failed to marshall the facts, as required,
when challenging a trial court's findings of fact. Dylon fails to
understand that the Co-personal Representatives are not challenging
the trial court's findings of fact on the 10% discount issue. The
Co-personal Representatives are challenging the trial court's
conclusion that Conder & Wangsgard's fee claim should be reduced by
the amount of profit decedent could have made on his remodel job.
On page 46 of their brief, the Co-personal Representatives state
that "the subsiding facts found by the court are correct, however,
this ruling wrongly equates the value of Conder & Wangsgard's
services with profits which may have been obtained with the remodel
job." The court received affidavits from both sides regarding the
profit margins in the construction industry.
408).

(R. 396-399, 401-

Nowhere in their brief do the Co-personal Representatives

allege that the trial court's findings of a 10% profit were
unsupported by evidence in the record.
1

In Reinbold v. Utah Fun Shares, 850 P. 2d 487 (Utah App. 1993),
the court explained when marshalling would be required by an
appellant. The court stated that "a prerequisite to an appellant's
attack on findings of fact is the requirement that appellant
marshall all the evidence in support of the findings in order to
demonstrate 'that the evidence, including all reasonable inferences
drawn therefrom, is insufficient to support the findings.'"

Id.,

quoting, Grayson Roper Ltd. v Finlinson, 782 P.2d 467, 470 (Utah
1989).

The court then went on, in quoting Bountiful v. Rileyr 784

P.2d 1174, 1175 (Utah 1989), to say that "an appellant's challenges
to the trial court's legal conclusions, 'on the other hand, are
reviewed for correctness and are not given special deference.'"
Reinbold/ 850 p.2d at 489.
The appellate court merely needs to review the trial court's
legal conclusion that Conder & Wangsgard's services should be
reduced 10% to account for profits decedent could have made on the
remodel for correctness.
2.
The reasonableness of Conder & Wangsgard's claim was not
an issue raised by Dylon.
In his response, Cross-Appellee Dylon rises the reasonableness
of Conder & Wangsgard's attorney fees claim.

This issue was not

disputed by Dylon at the trial court, Dylon did not ask for the
2

claim to be discounted for any reason.

In fact, Dylon's attorney

stated regarding Conder & Wangsgard's fees:
Mr. Abies: Well, he may have done the work. He may have done
the work. That's right. And I don't think that was disputed,
nor did we even go into the question of the - - reasonableness
of the thing. I won't - - I didn't challenge that. It's a
question of whether or not the claim was legally sufficient .
. .
(R. 1243).
Dylon's attorney challenged the attorney fee claim only as a
creditor's claim and not with regard to the reasonableness of the
fees.

In spite of this fact, Dylon argues on appeal that Conder &

Wangsgard's claim should not be viewed as a creditor's claim and
challenges the reasonableness of the fees.

Dylon waived this

argument long ago and cannot now assert such a position.
The court, on its own initiative, reviewed the reasonableness
of Conder & Wangsgard's fees using Dixie State Bank v. Brackenr 764
P.2d 985 (Utah 1988), even though Dylon did not raise the issue of
reasonableness at the trial court level.

Had Conder & Wangsgard

been requesting an award of attorney fees rather than being in the
position of creditor, a court would have been correct to review the
reasonableness of an attorney fee award on its own initiative using
the criteria set forth in Dixie.

However, in this case, the Co-

personal Representatives were merely petitioning the court to
approve a creditor's claim. Dylon was only concerned with whether
3

the claim was timely presented and not with the amount of the claim
itself. The application of Dixie to this claim is not appropriate
under the circumstances.

But even if Dixie were applicable, the

trial court should not have reduced Conder & Wangsgard's claim.
Ultimately, the 10% reduction ordered by the trial court had no
bearing on whether Conder & Wangsgard's fees were reasonable. The
court discounted the claim based on the profit margin in the
construction industry.

The court7s conclusion in equating profit

margin with Conder & Wangsgard's legal services and order a 10%
reduction of said fees is flawed.

Conder's testimony shows that

the construction services would be a credit against the attorney7s
fee bill.

(R. 382-386).

The court itself found that the

remodeling was to be a credit against legal services provided by
Conder & Wangsgard. (R. 432). It additionally found that Decedent
would have "earned a profit of 10% on the $37,820.81 claim by
Conder & Wangsgard and is entitled to a credit therefor."
435).

(R.

The profit margin enjoyed by the construction industry, was

the sole measure of the fee reduction.

Even the most strained

reading of Dixie does not include construction industry economics
in attorney's fees determinations.

4

POINT VII
DYLON'S ATTORNEY WAS NOT ENTITLED TO THE AN AWARD
ATTORNEY'S FEES FOR HIS SERVICES TO THE ESTATE.

OF

1. Cross-Appellee has improperly inferred a $10,504.79
benefit to the Estate.
Dylon attempts to justify the Court's award of $1,000 by
arguing that his attorney performed work that benefited the Estate
by $10,504.79.

Dylon asserts that his attorney benefited the

Estate, not only by causing

the

10% reduction

in Conder &

Wangsgard's claim, but by challenging the wake expenses and causing
a reduction of $5,000 in the Estate's attorney fees.
Dylon's argument goes beyond the trial court's findings to
infer benefits to the Estate that the trial court itself did not
recognize in awarding the $1,000 attorney fees.

In its Finding of

Fact No. 14, the trial court was very clear as to why it was
awarding

$1,000 attorney

fees.

"Dylon Husband

is therefore

entitled to an award of attorney's fees in the sum of $1,000 for
pursuing the objection to payment of fees to Conder & Wangsgard
plus $213.40 as costs."
the

preceding

(R. 677). This finding pertains only to

paragraph,

Finding

No.

13,

which

reads

"In

conjunction with the objection to payment of attorney's fees
incurred by decedent during his life, the efforts of counsel
Wendell

Abies

caused

the

estate
5

to

benefit

in the

sum

of

$3,782.08."

(R. 677).

Dylon also points to a minute entry of September 24, 1992 (R.
664) and the trial court's comments at a June 23, 1992 hearing
where the court stated, "the estate did benefit [by] the difference
between the claim and the amount of the discount, so it was some
benefit to the estate."

(R. 767). In addition, at the August 20,

1992 hearing, the court
percentage.

said

That's just —

"I awarded

them

fees,

less

the

that was this case, pure and simple.

The remainder of the issues you have brought up in this case really
had no bearing that would justify awarding fees."

(R. 1563).

$1,000 in attorney fees were awarded for the 10% (3,782.08)
reduction.
The benefit to the Estate did not come from the efforts of
Dylon's

attorney

but

Appellant's attorney

from

the

trial

court's

own

actions.

should not be rewarded because the trial

court, on its own initiative, caused the 10% reduction.

Even more

importantly, there was no statute or contract on which to base the
fee award and the $1,000 amount should not be paid from the Estate.

6

2. There was no basis for the trial court to award
Pylon's attorney any fees.
In their brief, Co-personal

Representatives

applied

the

guidelines set forth in Dixie State Bank v Bracken, 764 P.2d 985
(Utah 1985) even though there was no statute or contract which
authorized an award of attorney's fees.
page

affidavits

mentioned

on

page

Aside from the three one
50

of

the

Co-personal

Representatives' brief, Appellant's attorney did nothing for his
award.

He made no motion or argument to the court to cause a

benefit to the Estate to justify an award of fees. The court went
so far as to tell Dylon's counsel to present testimony regarding
the reduction issue. (R. 1329-1330). However, he failed to follow
the trial court's instructions. Additionally, the trial court said
"If I went by what you did, I shouldn't have even discounted it at
all."

(R. 1329-1330).

Even the trial court recognized that

Dylon's attorney did nothing to cause the Estate of benefit by
$3,782.08 (the 10% discount).
Under

Utah

law,

attorney

fees

are

awardable

"only

if

authorized by statute or by contract." Id. at 988. The court, out
of kindness, awarded Appellant's attorney $1,000. The $1,000 award
simply was not justified.

7

POINT VIII
THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY CHARGED THE COST OF A WAKE TO
PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE CONDER AND LINDSAY HUSBAND'S SHARE OF
THE ESTATE.
1. Co-personal Representatives need not marshall the
evidence where they are challenging the court's legal
conclusions,
A conclusion of law is accorded no particular deference and it
is reviewed for correctness. Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd., 771
P.2d 1033 (Utah 1989).

The issue of whether a wake can be a

funeral expense is a legal issue and the conclusion is a conclusion
of law. Hence, the Co-personal Representatives are not required to
marshall the evidence in support of the trial court's conclusions.
2. Reasonable funeral expenses may include customary
functions such as wakes which are associated with the
death of an individual.
Dylon,

in

his

response,

attempts

to

characterize

the

decedent's wake as an unorthodox and inappropriate function to hold
upon the death of a loved one.

However, wakes have significant

historical value and, in some cultures, are as important as the
burial itself.1

In this case, the decedent Mr. Husband would have

1

Wake
3. The watching (esp. by night) of relatives and
friends beside the body of a dead person from death to burial, or
during a part of that time; the drinking, feasting, and other
observances incidental to this. Now chiefly Anglo-Irish or with
reference to Irish custom. Also applied to similar funeral customs
in other times or among pagan peoples. Oxford English Dictionary
8

wanted a wake to be held at his death.

(R. 855-857).

Dylon

himself agreed that the wake was an appropriate function in
remembrance of his father.

(R. 840, 845).

It would have been

remiss for a wake not to be held in remembrance of the decedent.
Courts have defined what constitutes funeral expenses. In In
re Estate of Scherpich, 210 N.Y.S.2d 655 (Kings Co.Surr.Ct.1961),
(citation omitted), the court held that funeral expenses "include
accustomed

forms and ceremonies attending the disposition of

remains including reimbursement for expenditures for music, food
and flowers." See, Estate of Kircher. 473 N.Y.S.2d 679 (Sur. 1984)
(expenses for luncheon on date of burial was reasonable); see also,
In Re DiNezzo/s Estate, 267 N.Y.S.2d 67 (Eric Co.Surr.Ct. 1966)
(reception

at

restaurant

was

not unusual

nor

excessive

and

objection to cost was overruled).
Dylon cites to an 1890 Pennsylvania case as the authority on
how courts should consider a wake.

The case stands for the

proposition that the expenses of a wake, if not unreasonable, will
be allowed as an item of funeral charge.

"If the evidence had

shown that the wake, which preceded the burial of the decedent, was
made an occasion of feasting or intemperance, its expenses as an

Vol. II, pg. 31 (1971).
9

item of funeral charges, should have been disallowed."
Johnson's Estate, 8 Pa. Co. Ct. 1, 3 (1890).

In Re

In In Re Johnson's

Estate, the court found the wake was a proper funeral expense. The
wake held at decedent's club was not an occasion of feasting or
intemperance but was an opportunity for decedent's friends and
family to fondly remember him.
The wake is a reasonable funeral expense. Since the personal
representative, by statute, has the responsibility to pay all
reasonable funeral expenses, the heir Lindsay Husband and Conder
should not have to pay for the wake.
POINT IX
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY NOT CHARGING PART OF THE CO-PERSONAL
REPRESENTATIVE'S ATTORNEY FEE BILL TO DYLON HUSBAND.
1. The Co-personal Representatives are not challenging
the trial court's Findings of Fact and are not required
to marshall the evidence.
The trial court found that six of Dylon's seven causes of
action in his petition to surcharge Conder were without merit.
Finding No. 25 and 26 state:
25.
Dylon Husband's petition to surcharge personal
representative Jerrald D. Conder for rental on the 1988 Camero
IROC Z and the unauthorized distribution of decedents personal
property to Diane Mills and Ron Husband is without merit.

10

26. The Court finds that the personal representatives have
properly gathered and accounted for all of the assets of the
estate and that all claims, except as set forth herein, of
Dylon Husband are without merit. (R. 679).
The cost for the wake was the only claim the court deemed
meritorious.
The court made no finding regarding whether Dylon7s claims
were brought in good faith. Therefore the findings themselves are
legally inadequate for the court to conclude that Dylon should not
have to pay the personal representative7s attorney fees.

Under

Barnes v. Barnes, 857 P.2d 257, 259 (Utah App. 1993) (citation
omitted^, the court explained that where "the findings are legally
inadequate the exercise of marshalling the evidence in support of
the

findings

becomes

futile

and

the

appellant

is under

no

obligation to marshal." Here, the findings are legally inadequate
and Co-personal Representatives are under no duty to marshal.
2. Dylon has failed to show the claims brought by him
had merit or were brought in good faith.
Cross-Appellee states that "the claims had evidence to support
them, were debatable legally and they were brought in good faith."
Cross-Appellee's Brief at pg. 30.

Cady v. Johnson, 671 P. 2d 149

(Utah 1983) requires more than a conclusory statement that the
claims were brought in good faith and were legally debatable.
Dylon offers no argument to rebut the lack of good faith asserted
11

by the Co-personal Representatives in their brief.

Dylon took

advantage of the other heir by the meritless allegations in his
Petition to Surcharge the Personal Representative. The other heir
had no desire to take part in Dylon7s challenges.

Dylon7s self

interest at the expense of the other heir is prima facie bad faith.
Utah Code Ann. §78-27-56 states that "the court may award
reasonable attorney's fees to a prevailing party if the court
determines the action or defense to the action was without merit
and not brought or asserted in good faith."
merit as
importance

"bordering
having

on frivolity" and

no basis

in

law or

Cady defines without
"of

little weight or

fact."

Id. at 151.

Regardless of Dylon's opinion regarding his seven claims in his
Petition to Surcharge Conder, six of Dylon#s seven claims were held
to be meritless by the trial court. (R. 679).

Co-personal

Representatives have shown that those claims were also brought in
bad faith.

Because the requirements of §78-27-56 have been met,

Dylon should be ordered to pay the personal representative's
attorney fees on the claims made in his Petition to Surcharge
Personal Representative.

12

3. Co-personal Representative Snow reported his findings
on the Conder & Wangsgard claim to the trial court at the
June 14, 1991 hearing.
Co-personal Representative Snow testified extensively at the
June 14, 1991 hearing about his investigation into the Conder &
Wangsgard claim.

(R. 1010-1020).

Snow testified that, after his

investigation, he concluded that the work was actually performed
and that the fees were reasonable.

(R. 1015-1016).

attorney cross-examined Snow on his testimony.

Dylon's

(R. 1018-1020).

Cross-Appellee is simply wrong to state that Mr. Snow "did not
report at any time to the court with reference to the Conder &
Wangsgard claim."

Cross-Appellee's Brief at pg. 31.

The trial

court heard the details of Mr. Snow's investigation and conclusions
on June 14, 1991 and Dylon's attorney cross-examined Mr. Snow. In
fact, specific findings were made regarding Mr. Snow's report. (R.
434, Finding #11).
Cross-Appellee fails to address the real issue that Dylon
reneged on the stipulation prepared by his counsel. After Mr. Snow
concluded his investigation with a result contrary to Dylon's
desired outcome, Dylon proceeded to continue pursuing the very
issue covered under paragraph number 2 of the January 28, 1991
stipulation.

13

This continued assault on an issue which was dealt with by
stipulation occurred at the expense of the other heir and was not
made in good faith. The other heir should not have to pay for the
attorney fees incurred as a result of Dylon7s failure to abide by
the stipulation.
4. Dylon's arguments exemplify the meritless claims the
Co-personal Representatives have had to confront in
probating the Estate.
In his response, Dylon argues that the only reason Karen
Husband gave her support to personal representative Conder was
because of a payoff to Karen and her attorney for their testimony
and support of Conder.

Dylon cites to no evidence which would

support his distorted argument. Claims for alimony and support by
an ex-wife which are paid by the personal representative of
decedent's estate are not "payoffs" for giving support to the
personal representative. The Cross-Appellee then goes on to accuse
Conder of lying under oath and of repeatedly misstating the facts
with no evidence to support his attacks.
Dylon's arguments demonstrate the type of meritless claims
brought without good faith that the Co-personal Representatives
have continually had to confront in probating the Estate.
The other heir should not have to pay for the meritless claims
and challenges Dylon pursued at her expense where she actively
14

declined to participate in the litigation.

Dylon alone should be

charged for all of his meritless claims and challenges.
CONCLUSION
Dylon's attorney did not benefit the Estate by causing the 10%
discount in the Conder & Wangsgard claim and should not be
compensated.

Additionally, there was no statutory or contract

basis under which the court was permitted to award fees.

Dylon's

attorney is not entitled to any fee award whatsoever.
Conder & Wangsgard's attorney fees which made up its claim to
the Estate were never challenged by Dylon as unreasonable.

The

court utilized inappropriate standards in reducing the claim.
Conder & Wangsgard's claim should not have been discounted by the
trial court.
The wake was a reasonable funeral expense where the personal
representative authorized and the heirs, including Dylon, ratified
the propriety of the event. The cost of the wake should be charged
to the Estate and not to the personal representative and the other
heir.
The

Co-personal

Representatives

actively

wrapping the Estate up in an expeditious manner.

worked

toward

However, Dylon

continually bombarded the Estate with meritless challenges at every
turn and caused the delay in winding up of the Estate.
15

Dylon

should

have

to

bear

the

costs

of

litigation.

Co-personal

representatives, Conder and Snow, respectfully submit that this
matter should be remanded to the trial court with instructions to
modify

its

foregoing.

order

and

enter

judgment

in

accordance

with

the

\
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